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INACCURACY AND THE INVOLUNTARY
CONFESSION: UNDERSTANDING ROGERS
V. RICHMOND RIGHTLY
DEAN A. STRANG*
Inaccurate, unreliable, or altogether false confessions in custody are not
new. Long before the false confessions of the Central Park Five or Brendan
Dassey, others had been confessing falsely, without making the news.1
Often, false confessions include notably inaccurate details. Consider three
long past cases.
Stephen Boorn and his siblings were the local misfits in Manchester,
Vermont.2 And his sister’s husband had wanderlust, as the neighbors knew.3
But by the time that Stephen’s brother-in-law had been missing for seven
years, small-town suspicions prevailed. Stephen’s brother was arrested and
he eventually accused Stephen of murdering the missing brother-in-law.4 He
* Visiting Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law; A.B., Dartmouth
College; J.D., University of Virginia.
1
The “Central Park Five” is the common description of five teenaged boys who confessed
falsely, in coercive interviews by New York police officers, to raping a jogger in Central Park
in 1989. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to Settle
Suit for $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2014, at A1. Brendan Dassey was a 16-year-old
boy with learning disabilities when (after earlier questioning sessions) he finally gave a halting
statement inculpating himself in a murder, adopting some accurate details that law
enforcement officers provided but getting other details wildly wrong when left to his own
claims. His case drew worldwide attention in Netflix’s Making A Murderer. Making A
Murderer: Plight of the Accused (Netflix 2015), https://www.netflix.com/title/80000770
[https://perma.cc/J379-WCXB] [hereinafter Making a Murderer]; see also Dassey v.
Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding, 4–3, that the state court findings
of voluntariness were not so unreasonable that they could be set aside on federal habeas).
2
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT FOR ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
15–21 (1932). Borchard was a Yale professor of international law, not especially interested in
criminal law for its own sake, but convinced that governments have a moral responsibility to
compensate wrongly convicted people. In path breaking work, he and a research assistant
collected and documented 65 cases of innocent people convicted and imprisoned. See also
Bernard C. Gavit, Book Review, 8 IND. L.J. 147 (1932) (reviewing EDWIN M. BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932)).
3
BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 15.
4
Id. at 17.
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relayed to authorities the story of the murder that he claimed Stephen told
him, implicating himself, too.5
Months after Stephen’s ensuing arrest, during which authorities pressed
him intermittently to admit murder, Stephen did confess.6 He told a story
rich in detail but very different than the one his brother attributed to him—
and a story that did not implicate the brother, although again, his brother had
implicated himself.7
With the two confessions, supplemented by a jailhouse informant’s
claim that Stephen’s brother had confessed colorfully to him with yet a third
version of the murder, a jury convicted both brothers.8 They would hang.9
That is, they would until the murdered brother-in-law returned
reluctantly, but in fine health, from New York.10 He had left because he was
tired of marriage to Stephen’s sister.11 But no, the two Boorn brothers never
had hurt him.
Well to the south and almost exactly one hundred years later, Louise
Butler and George Yelder, a married man, were carrying on an affair in rural
Lowndes County, Alabama.12 Louise’s two nieces, 14 and 9, lived with her,
as did her 12-year old daughter.13 One day, Louise was in a jealous rage,
believing that George and the 14-year old niece had coupled in her absence.14
Louise beat the niece, who then disappeared.15
Eventually, through the efforts of a deputy sheriff, the two remaining
girls told a gruesome story of how Louise and George murdered the 14-year
old niece with an ax, dismembered her body, gathered it in a sack, and
dumped the sack in the river nearby.16 There was no physical evidence
supporting the story.17 In the custody of the sheriff himself, after several days
Louise supposedly gave a loosely similar confession, differing in some
details.18 She also showed the sheriff the spot on the river bank where she

5

Id.
Id.
7
Id. at 17–18.
8
Id. at 18.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 20.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 40–45.
13
Id. at 40.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 40–41.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 42.
6
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and George had pitched the body into the water.19 Louise then recanted
almost immediately.20
After a jury convicted George and Louise of murder, the dead niece
turned up in a neighboring county, living with other relatives to whom she
had fled after Louise beat her.21 Apparently, she did not like Aunt Louise.
Turning north again and back seventeen years, John “Dogskin” Johnson
was lurching through life in Madison, Wisconsin.22 He seems to have had
limited intellect, people thought him strange, and being drunk much of the
time did not help.23 When a neighboring 7-year-old girl disappeared from
bed overnight and turned up murdered in a nearby lake, suspicion fell on
Dogskin.24 Investigators faced at least three problems, though. First, a tiny
broken pane in the garret room in which the little girl slept with her two
brothers and the family dog would not have allowed the girl out, let alone a
grown man in.25 Second, the brothers and the dog, crammed into the small
room, had not awakened.26 Third, Dogskin’s wife said he had not left their
house that night.27
Arrested anyway, Dogskin Johnson maintained innocence in an “allnight grilling” and won his release.28 But then the police learned of his prior
record for taking liberties with girls and two commitments to “insane
asylums.”29 They arrested him again.30
After his re-arrest, Dogskin again withstood hard interrogation by police
officers for hours.31 He insisted that he was innocent.32 The police learned
from him, though, that he once had watched the brutal torture and lynching
of a black man.33 That experience left him terrified of mobs.34 And it gave
his interrogators the edge.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 112–21.
Id. at 113–16.
Id. at 112–14.
Id. at 114, 116.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116–17.
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In a ruse, the police eventually told Dogskin that a mob was gathering
for him outside the jail.35 Panicked, he confessed in detail.36 He also insisted
on pleading guilty that very day and won a promise that if he did, the police
would spirit him to the state penitentiary far from town immediately.37 He
pled guilty and the police kept their word (and their ruse), slipping him out
of town in the backseat of a car and insisting that he hide under a blanket for
the first ten miles.38 Dogskin was in prison the night of his plea.39 His
conviction rested on the confession alone, corroborated only by the fact that
the girl was dead.40
Like many prisoners before and since, Dogskin soon began to write
from his prison cell, urging his innocence.41 He had confessed only to avoid
a violent death at the hands of a mob, he insisted.42 It took nine years, but
eventually a former judge became convinced that Dogskin was telling the
truth: he was innocent.43 The former judge persuaded the governor to order
a pardon hearing.44 Publicity about that hearing prompted a surprise witness
to come forward, a good friend of the dead girl’s mother.45 That woman
relayed how she had seen the girl’s mother burning bloody bedding and a
little nightgown in the kitchen the morning after her disappearance.46 The
woman also had learned that the night before, the girl’s father—drunken
during a card game in that same kitchen—had bashed the girl behind the ear
with a beer bottle, causing her to pitch headfirst and unconscious into the
stove.47 The father carried the little girl upstairs to her cot and the family
found her dead in bed later.48 They hired a man to dispose of her body after
hiding it at home.49

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 120–21.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The statute of limitations on second-degree murder had passed, so the
girl’s father escaped justice.50 But Dogskin was freed after more than ten
years in prison.51
I
Butler’s judge probably excluded at least one of her statements after her
recantation and Boorn’s jury seems to have rejected his written confession
(convicting him all the same). But Johnson pled guilty and it appears that at
least some of their wildly incorrect statements got to the Boorn and Butler
juries.52 Because the three cases arose between 1819 and 1928 in state courts,
American judges would not have recognized a basis in the federal
constitution to exclude the statements, state law aside.53 Still, the
confessions’ unreliability, their outright lack of veracity, begged even then
the question: did Stephen Boorn, Louise Butler and the two girls, and
Dogskin Johnson speak voluntarily?
This Article explores the relationship between inaccuracy and
involuntariness and why courts mistakenly believe that they must ignore that
relationship. Part II begins with an overview of the relationships between
accuracy or inaccuracy of details in confessions, and voluntariness or
involuntariness of those incriminating statements. It identifies broadly, too,
the systemic values at stake in those relationships.
Part III follows with a brief history of the legal rationales supporting
exclusion of involuntary statements, tracing them lightly as they have
changed over time. It is background here and does not pretend to be a
comprehensive account.
Part IV introduces the principal case that established a mechanical
symmetry from the exclusive truth-seeker’s perspective, the United States
Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Rogers v. Richmond.54 That part looks
first at Rogers itself, and then at how courts have applied its test to bar

50

Id. at 118.
Id. at 110–18. As to the interrogation, Borchard described an “all-night grilling,” “hours
of rapid-fire and relay examination,” and “hammering at” Johnson with the aid of an outside
Burns Detective Agency employee. Id. at 112.
52
ROB WARDEN, WILKIE COLLINS’ THE DEAD ALIVE: THE NOVEL, THE CASE, AND
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 121–22, 153 (2005).
53
The federal government would not begin to exclude coerced confessions used in state
courts until 1936, when in Brown v. Mississippi the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s
involuntary confession extracted by use of police violence violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Later cases would develop further the
federal courts’ role in review of coerced confessions used in state courts. See infra Part III.
54
365 U.S. 534 (1961).
51
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consideration of both accuracy and inaccuracy of a confession in deciding
voluntariness.
Part V explains why courts have been both casual and wrong in that
application. It argues that only accuracy of details should be excluded as
irrelevant to voluntariness. Accuracy in the recollection of details is as likely
from a guilty but coerced speaker, a guilty and uncoerced speaker, or an
innocent and coerced speaker who was fed information by the police; so, if
coercion and involuntariness are unacceptable because dignity and integrity
are ends in addition to truth, then accuracy simply becomes irrelevant. In
other words, accuracy in detail is incapable of helping to discriminate among
those three possible explanations.
By sharp contrast, inaccuracy of a confession may be, and often is,
relevant to involuntariness: the voluntary speaker who wishes to confess has
no reason to give inaccurate details unless drugs, alcohol, or mental illness
cloud his recollection or he hopes to mitigate his responsibility. The first
cause he can explain; the second cause the police often are in a good position
to assess. But the involuntary speaker who is attempting just to make the
interrogation stop very well may spew inaccurate details, either because he
is factually innocent and does not know what happened or because he is
culpable but calculates his responses to please the interrogator, again so that
he gets the earliest and fullest relief from the interrogation. Because lack of
recall, false partial self-exculpation to reduce responsibility, or both, also are
lively possibilities (and common realities) in explaining inaccuracies, those
inaccuracies do not establish involuntariness by themselves. Instead, they
simply are probative of involuntariness. In a given case, the government may
carry its burden of proving voluntariness despite inaccuracies. In another
case, though, it may not. The point is that inaccuracies rightly bear on the
question of involuntariness.
Part VI concludes that Rogers v. Richmond is no bar to a proper
asymmetry in the consideration of accuracy and inaccuracy—courts can and
should consider inaccuracy in confessions when deciding whether they were
voluntary or involuntary, but should not consider accuracy as evidence that
the statements were voluntary. Understanding the case correctly, this has
been true since the day the Court decided Rogers. Part VI also concludes
that, from the perspective of the real world in which American courts must
and do have ends other than pure truth-seeking, including but not limited to
human dignity and institutional integrity, a rightful asymmetry in mechanics
produces no asymmetry in outcomes or values at all.
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II
Inaccurate details well may be relevant to involuntariness, although the
former does not always establish the latter. If a statement is inaccurate, if the
confessor has gotten basic details wrong, he possibly (but not certainly)
spoke out of fear, pain, or hope of gain to end the questioning, not out of
actual knowledge willingly disclosed. Or, he might have spoken voluntarily,
but just lied. Either way, inaccuracies in a confession at least bear on the
question of involuntariness.55
Likewise, there is a relationship between accuracy and voluntariness,
although, again, one does not establish the other. For example, a guilty
woman may have told the truth, accurately, but not necessarily because she
chose freely to do so. She might have spoken involuntarily, but given truthful
details—either because she actually was guilty but coerced to speak, or
because she was innocent and got accurate details from the police that she
adopted as her own.56 And of course, she might have spoken both accurately
and voluntarily, to unburden her conscience, salve her religious views, or
serve some other purpose.
If truth-seeking were the only goal of criminal justice, then, we still
would have to consider voluntariness of confessions instrumentally. Why?
Both voluntariness and involuntariness might bear on accuracy (or truth, in
other words). Deciding the voluntariness question would be an essential
means—one of many—to the end of truth-seeking. And consideration would
be symmetrical, in a sense. If truth-seeking were the exclusive goal, we
would want to explore whether accuracy suggested voluntariness in a given
case, and also would want to assess whether inaccuracy suggested
involuntariness. We would do both because it really would be accuracy and
inaccuracy that we cared about alone in the end, not voluntariness for its own
sake. Our conclusions on accuracy or inaccuracy then would determine our
further efforts to find truth.
But because the criminal justice system has ends and values in addition
to truth57—whether those other ends are subordinate, coordinate, or even
55
The Supreme Court has noted that “there may be a relationship between the
involuntariness of a confession and its unreliability,” although it never has said that this
relationship is the point of the doctrine of excluding coerced statements. Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 484 & n.12 (1972) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385–86 (1964)).
56
In the argot of police interview experts and psychologists, this is “contamination.” To
cite one widely known example, contamination featured prominently in the interrogation of
Brendan Dassey, the 16-year old boy in Netflix’s Making A Murderer, supra note 1.
57
See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (“There is no gainsaying
that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system,” but implicitly
acknowledging that it is not the only goal); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708–10
(1974) (recognizing privileges that serve interests important enough to block truth-finding,
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superordinate—the instruments change subtly. Indeed, voluntariness might
become a corollary end in itself, not just a means or an instrument. If
preserving individual human dignity and the integrity of human institutions
also are ends of criminal justice, then voluntariness is essential.58 An
involuntary confession undermines both individual and institutional integrity
and dignity, even if accurate. That is, the tormentor diminishes both the one
tormented and himself; the manipulator, the same.
Torment and
manipulation rob self-determination, and both the thief who stole it and the
person deprived of it are the less fully human for the loss. When the
tormentor or manipulator next comes to court bearing his shameful gain, the
judge becomes a fence: a receiver of stolen self-determination, who then
peddles the hot goods to jurors, if they are buying. As an institution, the court
itself loses integrity and with that, dignity.
If there is more to criminal justice than truth-seeking alone, then to
avoid defeat of the additional goals of dignity and integrity, we have to reject
even the accurate confession if involuntarily obtained.59 Truth-seeking can
co-exist with voluntariness, and can even retain primacy as an end, but the
additional ends of dignity and integrity—if they are to survive with truthseeking—require that we seek truth only by means other than involuntary
confessions.

but observing that “these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth”); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (defending the exclusionary rule and noting “the
imperative of judicial integrity”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of
the land;” referring to Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights); see also Stone v. Powell, 482 U.S.
465, 488 (1976); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64–65 (1954) (both acknowledging
the instrumental goals of the exclusionary rule, but weighing those against truth-seeking).
58
To the truth-seeker, a perceived asymmetry in outcomes emerges unavoidably.
Asymmetry in outcomes appears only from the perspective of the exclusive truth-seeker. For
her, single-minded in her goal, now some accurate confessions will come into evidence (the
voluntary ones) and some will not (the involuntary ones). For her, voluntariness is only a
means to the end of accurate fact-finding, so she sees an asymmetry in outcomes. Whether it
is an acceptable asymmetry on pragmatic grounds will depend on how commonly inaccurate
she believes involuntary confessions are, if at all. As to the importance of judicial integrity,
see, e.g., Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
59
The justice system posits other values, too, like efficiency and cost-effectiveness. I do
not intend to diminish these, but also do not rank them as values of first order, like truthseeking, human and institutional integrity, and human and institutional dignity. Because
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and other ends are secondary or lower objectives—to my mind,
at least—I leave them out. As secondary goals, they would not change my views on pursuing
primary goals.
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In fact, American courts admit that truth-seeking is not the exclusive
goal of criminal justice, even if it remains paramount.60 Integrity and dignity
also matter, both of individual people and of the larger institutions in which
they operate. Because integrity, human dignity, and truth-seeking all are
systemic goals of first order,61 both accurate and inaccurate yet voluntary
statements should be admitted at trial (compliance with other ends or goals
here assumed). But involuntary statements should be excluded, whether
accurate or inaccurate.
III
Again, the unreliable—inaccurate and outright false—confessions of
Stephen Boorn, Louise Butler, and Dogskin Johnson all came before the
United States Supreme Court barred coerced statements to the police from
state criminal trials.62 Since 1892, in Counselman v. Hitchcock, the Supreme
Court had barred from federal court all statements compelled by law,
acknowledging the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.63 But that
rule touched neither state trials nor statements uncompelled by law directly.
It was another 44 years before the Supreme Court first ruled that statements
coerced by law officers were inadmissible in state courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, in Brown v. Mississippi.64
Counselman and Brown addressed different problems. The first
prohibited compulsion by law directly;65 the second prohibited compulsion
not by law directly (that is, not by statute or rule), but by law officers.66 In
60

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
In addition to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 285–86, see, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–21 (1997) (listing specific fundamental freedoms that are
essential to ordered liberty, and that substantive due process doctrine protects; among these
are “bodily integrity” and other interests going to human dignity, like marriage, procreation,
and marital privacy); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926) (state action “shall be
consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all of
our civil and political institutions”); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26
(1937) (noting of such interests “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed”), overruled on other grounds by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
62
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) was the first.
63
142 U.S. 547 (1892). As Counselman itself acknowledged, an earlier case, Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), had considered both the Fifth Amendment selfincrimination clause and the Fourth Amendment in striking down a tax statute that compelled
production of incriminating private papers. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 580–82 (discussing
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 631, 633).
64
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
65
Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547.
66
Brown, 297 U.S. at 278.
61
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federal proceedings, the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause
forbade direct compulsion by law, either through statute or through judicial
instrument, like a subpoena.67 The Counselman principle was plain in the
Fifth Amendment’s text: the only tough interpretive question was how long
before trial something became a “criminal case” under that amendment’s
express terms.68
By contrast, Brown and the cases that followed did not address statutory
requirements that abused the constitutional privilege of silence. Rather, they
addressed unacceptable police conduct that abused the human body and will.
The cases featured brutal third-degree tactics: repeatedly hoisting a suspect
aloft by a rope around his neck;69 beatings with a leather belt and heavy
buckle across bare backs and buttocks;70 other forms of physical abuse;71 and
threats to abandon suspects to the deadly violence of gathered mobs, real or
imaginary,72 just as Wisconsin officers threatened Dogskin Johnson.73
67

Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547.
The answer was that the privilege against self-incrimination extended at least back to a
grand jury appearance under subpoena. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562 (“It is impossible that
the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be, that a person shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It would doubtless
cover such cases; but it is not limited to them. The object was to insure that a person should
not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal
matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.”).
69
See Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
70
See id. at 282.
71
See id. at 281–82.
72
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 564–67 (1958). For a collection of state cases
discussing fear of mob violence or threats to leave the accused to a mob, see, e.g., State v.
Hamilton, 337 Mo. 460, 465–66, 85 S.W.2d 35, 37–38 (1935).
73
See BORCHARD, supra note 2, at 115–16. In addition to Brown, early cases included:
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (threats to mother of loss of child custody); Gallegos
v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (also a juvenile case); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
(1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (eight or nine hours of sustained
interrogation in small room rendered confession “most probably” involuntary where accused
was mentally ill); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne, 356 U.S. at 564–67; Leyra
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (state psychiatrist obtained confession by ruse after sustained
police questioning); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)
(the Court’s first consideration of a coerced confession from a juvenile); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149–54 (1944) (declining
to resolve disputed details of the “secret inquisitorial practices” or even whether the accused
actually confessed, but holding that 36 hours of incommunicado interrogation without sleep
made the confession involuntary if there was one); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)
(threats of mob violence). These are the principal Supreme Court cases of the 30-year era
between Brown and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Court held a
confession involuntary. I do not list cases, like Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941),
and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), in which the Court rejected an involuntariness
68
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Here a complication emerges. Before the age of the incorporation
doctrine, when the Supreme Court began to consider explicitly which
guaranties in the Bill of Rights the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause was meant to include, the Court had applied the Fifth Amendment’s
self-incrimination clause—not its due process clause—to police conduct in
federal proceedings.74 Prior to the twentieth century, federal courts held that
any inducement might render a confession involuntary and thus compelled.
The Court explained that rule most famously in Bram v. United States.75
Bram considered a triple murder on the high seas, with the chief mate
later indicted, convicted, and sentenced to death in Boston federal court.76 At
trial, the government had introduced Bram’s non-denial into evidence—his
quibble with whether his accuser could have seen him commit one of the
murders from the accuser’s vantage point—and then his terse general
denial.77 Bram had made those statements after the officer questioning him
had asserted a firm belief in Bram’s guilt, and then added, “But . . . some of
us here think you could not have done all that crime alone. If you had an
accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible crime
on your own shoulders.”78 Bram was in custody at the time and had been
forced to disrobe partially so that his clothes could be searched, but the case
offered no other suggestions of coercion.79
The Bram court discussed at length both English and American state
precedents, laying out the exact coaxing words that courts in both countries

claim. Since Miranda, that prophylactic rule has gotten more attention from the Court than
voluntariness itself.
For an expanded discussion of the problem generally, as courts and others perceived it at
the time of Brown and later, see the so-called Wickersham Commission’s report on police
brutality and illegality. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1931) (describing police
abuses and misbehavior during prohibition era).
74
Placing the start of the era when the Supreme Court repeatedly has considered
incorporating specific aspects of the first eight amendments into the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process guaranty is dicey. Depending on what clarity of signal one seeks, Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and Chi., Burlington
& Quincy R.R v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), all are plausible points of origin of
incorporation doctrine. In any event, the incorporation debate seems roughly a twentieth
century process—although it has extended at least through McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause).
75
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
76
Id. at 537.
77
Id. at 538–40.
78
Id. at 539.
79
Id. at 538–39, 564.
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had found vitiated the voluntariness of a confession.80 Then it concluded that
Bram’s statements “must necessarily have been the result of either hope or
fear, or both, operating on the mind” of the prisoner.81 The statement was
involuntary; it was not made “without compulsion or inducement of any
sort.”82 It was inadmissible, a violation of the principle of nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare that the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause
enshrined.83 In federal courts of the late nineteenth century, then, the selfincrimination clause barred statements gained by the compulsion of either
the law itself or law officers.
But federal prosecutions were rarer than today, so those federal courts
had comparatively few criminal cases and still fewer appeals dealing with
involuntary statements in the aftermath of Bram. Because Bram came long
before the Supreme Court applied the privilege against self-incrimination to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, the
prohibition of involuntary confessions in state prosecutions never took root
in the self-incrimination clause. Not until 1964 did the Supreme Court hold
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s selfincrimination clause.84 By then, Brown, not Bram, was the rule.
Brown set much less rigorous guidelines for state police officers and
state cases than Bram had set for the rare federal prosecution. Brown and
cases following it ignored Bram’s mark of involuntariness as a promise or
inducement ever so slight. Instead, these courts asked whether a beating or
coercion was so severe that it marked an involuntary confession.85 From the
standpoint of assuring that trials remain untainted by confessions that are
unreliable because rooted in fear, pain, exhaustion, trickery, or induced hope
of gain,86 the doctrinal shift between Bram and Brown—with their different
constitutional loci—stands as one of the tragic missed opportunities of

80
81

Id. at 543–61.
Id. at 562. The discussion of prior English and American cases runs from pages 540–

61.
82
Id. at 548 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)). The most
common encapsulation of Bram’s holding comes from its quotation of an English treatise near
the beginning of the long discussion of earlier cases. “But a confession, in order to be
admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight . . . .” Id. at 542–43
(quoting 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 478 (6th
ed. 1896) (emphasis omitted)).
83
Id. at 544–45.
84
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4–11 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908), which explicitly had refused to apply the self-incrimination clause to the states.
85
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936).
86
See Bram, 168 U.S. at 542–43, 548.
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American jurisprudence. Arguably, too, the descent of Bram before the slow
ascent of Brown also created the vacuum in which “third-degree” tactics—
harsh, physically abusive or grueling forms of interrogation—and
incommunicado custody flourished in the first third of the twentieth
century.87
Still, the core principle that Brown and its progeny developed was
dignity, with two facets. First, the dignity of the court itself was sullied if it
admitted products of brutality into evidence. Second, the dignity of the
human being was tarnished when courts allowed state actors to overcome the
free will of suspects in eliciting coerced statements. For both reasons, states
could not use statements that beatings, threats, or other coercion had
produced. An involuntary statement offended both the dignity of the court,
if the police deployed it in judicial proceedings, and the dignity of the human
being who gave it only unwillingly.88 Due process would not tolerate either.
Instead, due process only tolerates confessions that are acts of free will. As
the Supreme Court put it later, “a complex of values underlies the stricture
against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient
shorthand, this Court terms involuntary.”89 Later still, the Court described
the fundamental due process objection even more summarily. Coerced
confessions are “offensive to a civilized system of justice.”90

87

See generally DEAN A. STRANG, WORSE THAN THE DEVIL: ANARCHISTS, CLARENCE
DARROW, AND JUSTICE IN A TIME OF TERROR 199–205 (rev. ed. 2016) (discussing third-degree
interrogation tactics in appendix).
88
Again, a coerced statement also degrades the dignity of the coercive police officer, but
the Court has left that largely unstated.
89
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); see also Brown, 297 U.S. at 285–86.
The Court did not articulate the twin dignity concerns explicitly in Brown, or the free-will
standard. It spoke more broadly of extorting confessions by torture, trial by ordeal, and
confessions that make the “whole [trial] proceeding” “but a mask.” Id. at 286. References to
free will being overborne and to judicial dignity did not appear explicitly until Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (confessions must be “the expression of free choice” and
suspect must not be “overborne”), and more clearly until ten years later in Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (accused’s “will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and
sympathy falsely aroused”). As to institutional integrity or dignity concerns, see also id. at
320–21 (“The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone
on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the
actual criminals themselves.”).
I use dignity when I refer to the individual human being’s interest, but sometimes use
integrity when I refer to institutional interests as I think it captures the idea better.
90 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).
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Today, the federal rule holds that involuntariness always requires some
official coercion or overreaching:91 a person’s own intrinsic inability, by
reason of mental illness or other weakness, to make a true volitional choice
to speak never is enough to make his statement legally “involuntary.”92 For
example, a command hallucination, heard only by the delusional person, does
not render his subsequent statement legally involuntary.93 Instead, a police
officer, or on rare occasion some other state actor, must do something
affirmative to exploit the person’s vulnerability.94
The usual formulation of voluntariness that Brown spawned is that an
accused’s statements, to be usable in court, must be “the product of a rational
intellect and a free will,” or words to that effect.95 Equivalently, the
accused’s statements are unusable if his “will was overborne.”96 There is no
actual test, though: trial courts should consider the “totality” of
circumstances in deciding the question of free will before admitting a
confession.97 At best, that is a method or an orientation, not a test, and at
worst it may be no more than an exhortation. By whatever measure, the
question of voluntariness is not for the jury alone; rather, the trial court must
determine voluntariness before the state offers a confession.98
Mechanically, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
voluntariness.99
In federal court, the standard of persuasion is a
preponderance; states may require more from the prosecution, but not less.100

91

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 164, 165–66.
93 Id. at 162, 167.
94 Id. at 167. For one example of the atypical involuntariness case in which the state actor
was not formally a law enforcement officer, see United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311 (E.D.
Wis. 1994), aff’d, 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 517 U.S. 1231 (1996),
aff’d after remand, 115 F.3d 413 (7th Cir. 1997) (social worker in county mental hospital,
acting in part to aid law enforcement, elicited involuntary confessions from a patient in her
care).
95
See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 307 (1963); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 208. The words vary, but the standard is always to
this effect.
96
Townsend, 372 U.S. at 307 (quoting Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961)); see also
Watts, 338 U.S. at 53.
97
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1968) (quoting Clewis v. Texas, 386
U.S. 707, 708 (1967)); see also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
98
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391–96 (1964).
99
Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
100
Id. at 482–89. Many states set the burden there, too, although some require more of the
prosecution—as Lego invited them to do. Id. at 489; see also Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About
Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL.
U. L. REV. 601, 642 n.228 (2006) (providing a non-exhaustive list of state rules).
92
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An involuntary confession may not be used at all in court: not in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, not for impeachment, not in rebuttal.101 A
mistakenly admitted involuntary confession once was, but no longer is,
reason for automatic reversal. Now, a conviction can stand if the prosecution
proves the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.102
The jury cannot screen a confession for voluntariness in the first
instance—again, that is a judge’s job before the state offers the confession.
But the defense can insist that the jury determine the reliability of that
confession in the end.103
This is where the law of involuntary confessions stands today, then.
Normative alternatives and a missed opportunity aside, the question is due
process generally, not the privilege against self-incrimination specifically.104
Indeed, the Supreme Court has jettisoned Bram. As even the more moderate
plurality conceded in Arizona v. Fulminante, the Bram rule that a confession
may not be obtained by promises or inducements, however slight, by 1991
did “not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a
confession.”105 A pretrial hearing on admissibility will decide voluntariness,
with the prosecution carrying a burden of at least a preponderance of the

101
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–08 (1985); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,
459 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 402 (1978); cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975) (otherwise trustworthy statement taken in violation of Miranda may be used for
impeachment, although not in the prosecution’s case-in-chief).
102
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306–12 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., announcing the
holding on this point) (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error
doctrine to involuntary confessions for first time).
103
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
104
Some academic writers gamely have suggested reconsidering the normative
framework and have proposed new regimens for considering voluntariness under the selfincrimination clause, the due process clause, or both. For a sampling, see Mark A. Godsey,
Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (2005); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness,
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Lawrence Herman, The
Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and
the Involuntary Confession Rule, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (1992); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking
Self-Incrimination, Voluntariness, and Coercion, Through a Perspective of Jewish Law and
Legal Theory, 12 J. L. SOC’Y 72 (2010); Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law:
Toward Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting the deontological
strand of voluntariness doctrine (odious police practices) and the consequentialist strand
(concern over false confessions) and arguing that they should be disentangled and separated
into different tests). In the courts so far, no takers.
105
499 U.S. at 285.
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evidence. If the judge decides that the balance tips toward voluntariness, the
jury may hear an otherwise admissible confession.106
In making that determination, the totality-of-the-circumstances rhetoric
amply cloaks a wide range of intellectual dishonesty by trial and appellate
judges. They regularly wave through custodial confessions when police
officers have lied to suspects about facts and evidence, fed facts, bullied,
cajoled, promised leniency, and otherwise manipulated or intimidated
suspects. They do so even when the suspects were young, inexperienced,
obviously mentally ill, clearly unintelligent or cognitively disabled, drunk,
high, exhausted or sleep-deprived, or some combination of these qualities.107
IV
With all that the totality-of-the-circumstances phrase allows, and by its
terms it proposes to allow everything, there is one striking exception: courts
may not consider the accuracy or truthfulness of a confession in deciding its
voluntariness. That bar rests on one Supreme Court decision now nearly six
decades old, Rogers v. Richmond.108 The prohibition is right, both as a matter
of fidelity to Rogers and of logic: accuracy of a confession’s details does not
bear logically on its voluntariness or, therefore, on its admissibility. But is
the inverse—that inaccuracy of a confession’s details does bear on
voluntariness—also foreclosed by Rogers and its logic, as most courts have
assumed or ruled?109 No.
A

One evening in November 1953, Dorothy Kennedy was working alone
in the liquor store that she and her husband owned in West Haven,

106
By “otherwise admissible,” I mean simply that involuntariness is not the only possible
reason for excluding a confession. There may be a Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
issue, or a Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), issue in a joint trial, or some other
possible reason for keeping a confession from a jury.
107
Marcus, supra note 100 (discussing a review of every reported state and federal
voluntary confession appellate decision between 1985–2005 and documenting all of these
common factors). For one more recent graphic example, consider the videotaped excerpts of
Brendan Dassey’s confession that Making A Murderer offered. As the full videotape confirms,
Dassey was a mentally limited 16-year old. After haltingly adopting or conceding details often
supplied by police interviewers and admitting, in that fashion, his direct involvement in the
rape and murder of a young woman, Dassey asked if he could return to school because he had
a project due in sixth period. Making A Murderer, supra note 1.
108
365 U.S. 534 (1961).
109
See infra note 140.
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Connecticut.110 At about 7:30 p.m., someone came in, robbed the cash
register of $60, and killed Dorothy with a gun.111
More than six weeks later, in early January 1954, New Haven police
sought Harold Rogers in connection with a separate break-in and theft at a
hotel.112 The police found Rogers sitting in his car with a .38 caliber revolver
and arrested him.113 They learned soon that the gun had been reported stolen
from Rogers’s nephew the very day that Dorothy Kennedy was murdered.114
Later ballistics testing matched the gun to the bullets that killed her.115
Rogers eventually confessed twice to shooting Dorothy Kennedy and
robbing her store.116 Convicted at trial of first-degree murder, he was
sentenced to death.117 On appeal, he argued principally that his confessions
were involuntary and should have been excluded.118 He claimed that jailers
had refused to allow his lawyer into the jail and that a police officer had
pretended, in his presence, to call other officers with directions that they
bring his wife to police headquarters and take their foster children into
detention.119 Only under this duress had he confessed, he said.120 Then, he
reasoned, his later confession to the coroner was but a product of the first.121
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors rejected his arguments and
agreed with the trial court that his confessions were voluntary. “The question
is whether, under these and other circumstances of the case, that [police]
conduct induced the defendant to confess falsely that he had committed the
crime being investigated,” the state supreme court opined.122 Or, restated,
“the question for the court to decide was whether this conduct induced the
defendant to make an involuntary and hence untrue statement.”123 No, that
court answered.124

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d 409, 411 (Conn. 1956).
Rogers, 120 A.2d at 411.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
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After a complicated post-conviction history, Rogers eventually got to
the United States Supreme Court on federal habeas review.125 The basic issue
there, again, was the voluntariness of his confessions. A factual dispute on
exactly what the police had said to Rogers during the course of interrogation,
and when or if he had requested a lawyer, presented a messy case.126
The Supreme Court decided that it did not have to sift through the
factual mess, though. Both the Connecticut trial court and state supreme
court had applied the wrong standard for deciding the voluntariness of a
confession.127 They repeatedly had considered whether the police tactics
might have produced false confessions, not whether those tactics produced
involuntary ones:
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascertained
extent, found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding
confessions that are not voluntary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed, in
many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause has compelled
us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions obtained by
impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the
truth of what the defendant had confessed.128

The state courts had decided admissibility of the confessions “by
reference to a legal standard which took into account the circumstance of
probable truth or falsity.”129 That was an impermissible standard under the
Fourteenth Amendment.130 Rogers was entitled to have the state courts
consider anew whether he confessed voluntarily, under the proper
standard.131
On remand, the state apparently offered Rogers a reduced charge of
second-degree murder and a life sentence.132 He reportedly took the deal.133

125

Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 537–40 (1961).
Id. at 535–37.
127
Id. at 540.
128
Id. at 541.
129
Id. at 543. Note that “truth or falsity” is a formulaic phrase, in the academic sense;
what linguists once called automatic speech or embolalia. In other words, it is a stock
expression, used often and uncritically, that has signification as a whole, independent of its
strict lexical or grammatical meaning and construction, and not processed word-for-word by
those competent in a given language.
130
Id. at 543–44.
131
Id. at 543–44, 548–49.
132
Wilfred J. Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases
Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court and Some Current Problems, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 202,
209 n.33 (1962).
133
Id.
126
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Although the Rogers court made one reference to the impropriety of
taking “into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity,”134 the
decision rested on the fact that the Connecticut courts had asked whether
anything the police or coroner did called into real question the accuracy of
the confessions.135 The state court decisions reflected an implicit assumption
that Rogers had confessed truthfully and accurately. Given the facts that
Rogers had his nephew’s gun at the time of his arrest, that the nephew had
reported the gun stolen before the liquor store robbery and murder, and that
ballistics testing linked the fatal bullets to the gun in Rogers’s possession,136
the assumption that Rogers in fact was the murderer had support. Both state
courts below clearly believed him guilty in fact, and the United States
Supreme Court nowhere disputed that belief; his guilt and the truthfulness
and accuracy of his confessions simply were beside the point. Even ignoring
Rogers’s later guilty plea to a reduced charge, the case for his guilt was
strong. A judicial focus on the accuracy—not the possible inaccuracy—of
his confessions was unsurprising.
B

Rogers v. Richmond stands as solid support for the proposition that
courts must not consider accuracy or probable accuracy of a confession as
any proof of its voluntariness. The confession may be perfectly truthful and
accurate. But if it was involuntary, its truth and accuracy will not save its
admission—and indeed, accuracy does not matter to the due process
question.
In the main, though, for almost six decades state and lower federal
courts have read Rogers casually and more broadly. They often have
assumed, uncritically, that just as accuracy has no role in deciding
voluntariness, so too inaccuracy or untruthfulness of a confession must have
no role in deciding its involuntariness.137 Truth does not bear on
voluntariness, yes; but courts have seized on and quoted the passing reference
to “truth or falsity” in Rogers.138 So implicitly, maybe falsity would not bear
on involuntariness, either. Courts have assumed that the Rogers proposition
bars the inverse of the proposition. On occasion, but less commonly, they

134
135

Rogers, 365 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d 409, 413 (Conn. 1956); see also Rogers, 365 U.S. at 540–

43.
136
137
138

State v. Rogers, 120 A.2d at 411.
See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text.
365 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added).
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have gone further and expressly held that the inverse is foreclosed, rejecting
claims that confessions were both untrue and involuntary.139
The vast majority of courts fall into the first group of casual or
deliberately broad readers. Just a few examples will suffice here, but the
assiduous or skeptical can find many more than the ten I choose for a round
number.140
At least one other court seemed not to understand Rogers v. Richmond
at all, although this is rare. Thirty years after that case, the Virginia
intermediate appellate court still seemed to equate involuntariness with
unreliability.141

139

See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text.
The reported appellate decisions run into the dozens, at least, and probably the
hundreds. A sampling of these includes: Moorer v. South Carolina, 368 F.2d 458, 462 (4th
Cir. 1966) (inculpatory statement never actually admitted, but the fact that defendant had said
something to the police that the state wished to offer was presented to the jury, and defendant
had no chance to have the jury consider voluntariness (this trial occurred before Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)); Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(several references to ignoring “truth or falsity” in deciding voluntariness); United States v.
Pumpkin Seed, No. CR 17-50017-JLV, 2018 WL 6567258, slip op. at *3-4 (D.S.D. December
13, 2018) (defendant in first percentile of full-scale IQ challenged voluntariness of confession
and called psychiatrist on his susceptibility to giving false confession; court discounts that
evidence on grounds that, “Whether he subsequently gave a false confession is a separate jury
question” from whether the statement was voluntary, and then quoting “truth or falsity”
formula); State v. Sheppard, 987 S.W.2d 677, 679–80 (Ark. 1999) (defendant disputed
truthfulness of his confession, which a police investigator had written and he had signed; trial
court excluded it as “not the statement of the defendant at all” and “inherently
nontrustworthy;” reversed on state’s interlocutory appeal on express grounds that the trial
judge should not have considered the untrustworthiness of the statement; one reference to truth
or falsity); In re Schlette, 42 Cal. Rptr. 708, 712–14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (defense argued
at trial that confession was false; court of appeals decides voluntariness “without regard to the
confession’s truth or falsity”); State v. Staples, 399 A.2d 1269, 1272, 1273 (Conn. 1978) (two
references to ignoring “truth or falsity”); one reference to deciding voluntariness without
regard for truth or falsity on remand); People v. Weger, 185 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. 1962) (several
references to ignoring “truth or falsity” in deciding voluntariness); Mulligan v. State, 308 A.2d
418, 424–25 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (defendant claimed involuntariness and falsity of
confession; court makes two references to deciding voluntariness without regard to truth or
falsity); State v. Hayes, 424 N.W.2d 624, 625–26 (Neb. 1988) (defendant, a high school
dropout with below average reading and writing skills, claimed confession involuntary and
testified at trial to a different version of fact; on appeal, voluntariness affirmed with reference
to voluntariness not resting upon “probable truth or falsity”); Davis v. State, 499 S.W.2d 303,
304–05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (defendant seems to have denied truth of his confession at
trial and claimed it coerced; two references to deciding voluntariness without regard to truth
or falsity).
141
Neustadter v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 391, 397 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). Implicitly,
the court suggested more than once that only an unreliable confession could be involuntary.
140
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Finally, once in a while, a court approaches indirectly and timidly the
possibility that Rogers v. Richmond may not foreclose asking how a false
confession bears on involuntariness, although it does foreclose asking how
accuracy bears on voluntariness.142 Even that tiptoe approach to a basic
question—Rogers clearly makes accuracy of a confession irrelevant to
voluntariness, but is its inverse foreclosed? In other words, is inaccuracy of
a confession relevant to voluntariness?—has been very rare.
V
Nothing in Rogers v. Richmond’s factual background, in the Supreme
Court’s opinion itself, or in the Connecticut high court’s opinion below, gives
any real warrant—let alone a mandate—for reading the case as holding that
the inverse proposition must be foreclosed, even if true. Rogers forecloses
reliance on accuracy as any proof of voluntariness. Considered without the
clutter of casual or unthinking readings, Rogers does not foreclose reliance
on inaccuracies as some proof of involuntariness.143
Again, Harold Rogers probably was guilty, at least on the facts that the
Connecticut high court and the United States Supreme Court recited.144 The
point, then, was that accuracy and truthfulness of that man’s admissions had
no place in deciding whether he spoke voluntarily. But suppose another
Rogers arrived in the Supreme Court with real questions about his innocence,
in a case without the significant corroboration that the first Rogers’s case
142
See, e.g., United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1018 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
banc). Preston is ambiguous. The body of the opinion predictably recites that “the
voluntariness inquiry focuses not on the truth or falsity of the confession, but on the coercive
nature of the interrogation—again, taking into account the particular circumstances of the
suspect.” But the related lengthy footnote then does observe that, “Although probable truth
does not demonstrate that a confession was voluntary, we note that there is abundant research
that the intellectually disabled ‘are more likely to confess falsely for a variety of reasons.’” Id.
at 1018 n.13 (citation omitted). It goes on to assert that, “Recognizing the heightened
likelihood of false confessions by intellectually disabled suspects does not contravene Rogers’
directive that truth or falsity is not part of the voluntariness inquiry.” Id. Rather, “our
observation regarding false confessions by the intellectually disabled . . . informs the
importance of carefully taking into account the intellectual disability of the suspect—not the
truth or falsity of the confession—as part of the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness
inquiry.” Id. So, while even Preston in the end rejects direct consideration of falsity as a
possible marker of legal involuntariness, it at least evinces an awareness of a factual
connection and looks for a way indirectly to include falsity in the inquiry.
143
I refer only to Rogers v. Richmond on this point. But Jackson v. Denno also says, “It
is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his
conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for
the truth or falsity of the confession.” 378 U.S. at 376 (1964). Jackson cites only Rogers there
and adds nothing to Rogers on that point.
144
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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apparently had. Suppose this second Rogers could claim plausibly not just
that he confessed involuntarily but that he confessed falsely. The Supreme
Court’s 1961 decision simply does not necessarily foreclose the possibility
that factual inaccuracies in this next man’s confessions properly might have
helped to demonstrate their involuntariness.
American courts have read Rogers both carelessly and wrongly to bar
inaccuracies from the assessment of voluntariness, just as the case bars
accuracy.145 The conditional proposition of Rogers, rightly read, is that if
details of a confession are accurate, then that is irrelevant to voluntariness.
The conditional proposition is true. As a matter of logic and experience,
though, its inverse also may be true: if details of a confession are inaccurate,
then that is not irrelevant to voluntariness. A case that stands clearly for the
conditional proposition does not necessarily stand against its inverse.
Rightly understood, the case allows the inverse, if true, just as the conditional
proposition itself logically allows the inverse.146
And the inverse is true. A prisoner who gives accurate details to his
interrogators can be a guilty/coerced speaker, a guilty/uncoerced speaker, or
an innocent/coerced speaker to whom the interrogators supplied details.147 If
coercion and involuntariness are unacceptable because dignity and integrity
are ends, as every case over the quarter century between Brown and Rogers
asserted, then accuracy simply is irrelevant. Accuracy in detail is incapable
of helping to discriminate among those three possible explanations—
incapable of divining whether those ends of dignity and integrity were
satisfied or not. Courts must look instead to the means of obtaining the
confession, not retrospectively to its accuracy.
By contrast, inaccuracy of a confession may be, and often is, probative
of involuntariness.
Unlike accuracy, inaccuracy may itself help
retrospectively to determine the means by which police elicited the
confession or understand their effects. The inaccuracies are probative of the
involuntariness question, but not necessarily dispositive of it.
This distinction is important. A voluntary speaker who wishes to
confess may give inaccurate details because intoxication or mental illness

145

See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
As a matter of the philosophy and mathematics of logic, the truth of a conditional
proposition allows the truth of its inverse, too. If P → Q is true, ~P → ~Q also may be true.
See, e.g., KARL J. SMITH, THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICS 89–95 (13th ed. 2016).
147
Or, in theory, an innocent/uncoerced speaker who either is mentally ill or is taking a
fall for someone, and in either case luckily guessed just right at factual details. The innocent
who seeks to inculpate himself freely and who guesses correctly at details of a crime he did
not commit will be more of a theoretical possibility than real-life presence in police precinct
houses, though.
146
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eroded her memory or she seeks to reduce her responsibility. But it also is
true that the involuntary speaker who seeks just to stop the interrogation may
offer inaccurate details. This might be either because she is innocent and
does not know what happened or because she is guilty but assesses which
responses will satisfy the interrogators and end the questioning most quickly.
In all events, inaccuracies at very least are relevant to involuntariness. The
judge has only to sift the types of inaccuracies in light of all other known
circumstances—was the prisoner in fact drunk or deluded at the time of the
crime; did the prisoner exaggerate or understate her culpability?—to assign
proper weight to inaccuracies in the voluntariness query.
And because lack of memory, false partial evasion of responsibility, or
both, are common factors in explaining inaccuracies, again those
inaccuracies may not establish involuntariness by themselves. But they are
probative.
In an evidentiary process that exalts the totality of circumstances, a case
that serves one conditional proposition—if details are accurate, then that is
irrelevant to voluntariness—never should have been read to ban its inverse
conditional proposition. For both the proposition and its inverse may be true.
Indeed, the inverse of Rogers v. Richmond is true: if details are inaccurate,
then that is not irrelevant to voluntariness. The inaccuracies help a court to
get closer to the truth not of a crime, but of the question whether the
supplementary ends of dignity and integrity were honored. Since Rogers,
courts never should have read the case to foreclose its inverse proposition.
Logic and experience support both the Rogers proposition and its inverse.
VI
A

Again, before Brown, as a matter of federal law, when Stephen Boorn,
Louise Butler, and Dogskin Johnson stood trial involuntariness did not make
their confessions inadmissible in state courts; state law alone determined that.
Given the slim record of those cases that we have now, the exact challenges
to Boorn’s written confession and to one of Butler’s oral statements are
unclear. It seems certain that Johnson, who pled guilty the same day, did not
challenge the voluntariness of his confession.
All three of these people were convicted, though, in part on the basis of
false confessions. Boorn was sentenced to hang;148 Butler and Johnson, to

148
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92

STRANG

[Vol. 110

life in prison.149 They all escaped their fates only by luck, and for Johnson,
luck waited ten years.150
For our purposes, all of those confessions carried obvious indications of
possible falsity even before two “murdered” people turned up healthy and, in
Dogskin Johnson’s case, before the truth of a little girl’s death emerged a
decade later. Each case also had features, teased from the dry summaries that
Professor Borchard provided, that might have sharpened an involuntariness
inquiry. Those features included relevant inaccuracies in all three cases.
Boorn was an outcast, a social misfit, who was interrogated repeatedly
over months by authorities.151 His eventual confession did not match the
admissions that his brother claimed Stephen had made.152 Beyond that,
Boorn’s police confession lay greater claim to his own criminal responsibility
than even his brother attributed to him.153 The brother had implicated both
Stephen and himself, but Boorn implicated only himself in his statement to
the police.154 Finally, the third “confession” that the state of Vermont offered
at trial was his brother’s supposed statement to a jailhouse informer, who got
a benefit of early freedom in exchange for his testimony against Boorn.155
Overarching all of these three supposed confessions was one truth: no
physical evidence or disinterested witness corroborated any version of a
murder.
Butler was a black woman, apparently impoverished, in rural Alabama
during the Jim Crow era.156 She supposedly confessed to a male sheriff,
surely white, and it seems she and the sheriff were the only two witnesses to
the circumstances of her confession.157 In questioning Butler, the sheriff
(who later would describe Butler as “ignorant,” according to Borchard) had
the benefit of a lurid version of a murder that a deputy obtained earlier from
her young niece and daughter.158 Butler eventually took credit for a gruesome
murder, loosely similar in details to the versions that the girls gave and the
sheriff could have supplied.159 That murder unavoidably would have left
blood and gore after its ax attack and dismemberment. But blood and gore
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id. at 43, 115.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 17, 18–19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 40–42, 45.
Id. at 42.
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were utterly absent from the scene, for all Borchard’s account shows (and
recall again, the murdered girl later turned up unhurt). For that matter, the
state found no body that supposedly had been pitched into the river in a sack.
The absence of a body perhaps river currents could explain, but the absence
of any physical evidence at the supposed murder scene was not easily
dismissed and nowhere explained.160
By inference, Dogskin Johnson perhaps was, in today’s parlance,
cognitively impaired. He also abused alcohol and was an object of wide
public derision; again, a social outcast.161 His confession came after hours
of interrogation that even the buttoned-down Borchard depicted as harsh and
a police trick that exploited deliberately this man’s deep terror of mob
violence, from watching a lynching sometime earlier.162 The confession
failed utterly to explain, and could not be reconciled with, known physical
facts: Johnson could not have entered the house through the tiny broken
window pane; even the little girl could not have left the house that way; and
neither the girl’s brothers nor her dog, just feet away in the same room, were
awakened by a breaking window or intruder anyway.163 Lastly, there was no
alternate explanation for how Johnson might have entered the family’s
house.164
So, what if those three courts could have considered inaccuracy of
details in these confessions in deciding whether the statements were
voluntary? Wild inaccuracies logically might have helped to understand the
months of intermittent interrogation that led to Boorn’s statement. They
reasonably might have shed light on what really passed between the sheriff
and Louise Butler alone in his office and at the river’s edge. They might
have helped meaningfully to reveal why Dogskin Johnson fell apart and
abandoned his repeated claims of innocence in the jail. At very least, what
160

Throughout his book, Borchard treated white as the neutral color or race and mentioned
ethnicity or race only as to non-whites; for example, he described Louise Butler as a “plump
light-brown negress” and her paramour as “a lean colored gentleman.” Borchard also quoted
the sheriff (whose race and color he did not mention) later making a reference to “white-folks”
in a context that included law enforcement, so almost surely—even apart from historical
realities in the 1920s deep south—that the officers were white. Id. at 29.
161
Id. at 114.
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Id. at 116–17.
163
Id. at 116.
164
Although Borchard did not describe physical violence by the police or say squarely
that Johnson was held incommunicado, the terms he did use suggested that the police
interviews may have employed “third-degree” tactics that were common in the early 1900s
before Brown. Id. at 116; see also STRANG supra note 87 and accompanying text. Indeed,
Borchard even described Johnson as “psychologically ‘beaten’ into a confession,” and this is
one of the few cases in which Borchard criticized police conduct overtly. BORCHARD, supra
note 2, at 119.
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if courts today could consider inaccuracies like these in deciding
voluntariness, when the inevitable successors of Boorn, Butler, and Johnson
come along again as they frequently do?
Together, these three old cases display several common vulnerabilities
that can contribute to false confessions. Those include social ostracism or
living on social margins, possible cognitive impairment, disadvantages of
race and class, lack of sophistication, hope of benefit or leniency, youth
(especially Butler’s niece and daughter), drug or alcohol dependency, public
outrage over a crime and pressure on the police to solve it, and the anchoring
bias effect of a prior record on the police. The three cases also include several
features of police conduct that can contribute to false confessions: prolonged
questioning; intermittent questioning over weeks or months (in Boorn);
multiple questioners; absence of a lawyer during interrogation, almost
certainly; isolation; official trickery, manipulation, and deceit; sleep
deprivation; and induced fear (certainly in Johnson). None of these points of
vulnerability, none of these police stratagems, were new then; all persist now,
although some (physical pain, questioning over weeks or months) are less
common today.165
A judge considering the confluence of some of these factors rightly
might view the inaccuracy of details given in those circumstances as bearing
on voluntariness. If the voluntariness of the confession is in doubt, might not
inaccuracies bear logically on that question? Of course. And the more so
where a lack of physical trace evidence is not just surprising, but
inexplicable. Or where the inaccuracy seems to overstate the confessing
prisoner’s culpability, not understate it. Or where the prisoner’s account is
hopelessly at odds with objectively verifiable facts.
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For risk factors generally in false confessions, see, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT,
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(focusing primarily on related problem of confession contamination); Saul M. Kassin, False
Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform, 1 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
112 (2014); Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 332–43 (2009); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in
the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). In offering
this partial survey, I choose Professors Drizin, Leo, Ofshe, Kassin, and Garrett in part because
they all have written much more than I cite here on the contributing risks to, and general
phenomenon of, false confessions. Sometimes, two or three of them have written together or
with still others.
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Nothing in Rogers v. Richmond bars that consideration. The fact that
the Court employed once a formulaic phrase—“truth or falsity”166—does not
foreclose the relevance of inaccuracy to involuntariness. In its entirety,
Rogers v. Richmond rested for good reasons on the premise that the
confession there was truthful.167 Truth was the assumption; falsity was not
the issue at all. Rather, the question was whether the police overbore the
prisoner’s will—and with more lawyerly precision, that was the “question to
be answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact
spoke the truth.”168
A quarter century after Brown, the Supreme Court still was struggling
to impress upon American courts the importance of human and institutional
dignity and integrity goals, apart from truth-seeking. Although grants of
certiorari often are hard to explain confidently, especially at six decades’
distance, still try to imagine why the Court otherwise took this case: if not an
effort to advance goals beyond narrow truth-seeking, then the Supreme
Court’s work was mere error correction on behalf of a man almost surely
guilty. Whatever the reasons for taking the case, though, Rogers v. Richmond
unmistakably made the point that other goals matter, again. Ignoring the
accuracy of a confession in deciding its voluntariness is entirely consistent
with, indeed perhaps essential to, honoring those dignity and integrity goals.
But ignoring inaccuracy of a confession as bearing on its possible
involuntariness is not essential to honoring those distinct goals. To the
contrary, because identifying coerced or otherwise involuntary confessions
is a central goal of these dignity and integrity concerns, anything that bears
logically on the question of involuntariness should be available to a judge.
Accuracy of details in a confession does not make it more likely that the
confession was voluntary, for reasons outlined in Part II and explained in Part
V. The guilty speaker can be coerced as readily as the innocent one, and
either can be supplied facts by the police, through intentional or inadvertent
contamination of the interview. But inaccuracy of details, although rarely
dispositive alone, surely bears logically on possible involuntariness. Yes, the
inaccurate speaker may be guilty but understating his culpability strategically
or just unclear about details because of his mental state at the time. But he
also may be giving inaccurate details because he is innocent, does not know

166
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543 (1961). This stock phrase, an automatic
expression signaling neutrality, is what the Court repeated in Jackson v. Denno, again only
once. 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); see also supra note 129.
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See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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the true details, and is trying to please an overbearing interrogator or to end
a process in which he is an unhappy, involuntary participant. Whichever of
these alternatives proves correct or probable, the inaccuracies are relevant;
they help get logically to the answer.
For that matter, the types of inaccuracies are sorted easily. Understating
or deflecting culpability more likely suggests an act of volition, although not
surely; but overstating culpability, for obvious reasons, may signal
involuntariness (if not mental illness or desire to protect a friend or family
member). Peripheral inaccuracies that can be squared easily with physical
evidence or known objective facts bear on involuntariness, although perhaps
weakly in the absence of police contamination; but inaccuracies that defy
reality or that are impossibilities (or near impossibilities) given other
objective evidence again are strong signals of possible involuntariness.
In all events, acknowledging the probative value of inaccuracies in
considering involuntariness is consistent with the factual and legal context of
Rogers v. Richmond. That acknowledgment also presents no asymmetry in
the supplemental systemic goals of dignity and integrity—of the individual
accused, of law enforcement officers, and of courts and other criminal justice
institutions themselves. Acknowledging this probative value, and admitting
inaccuracies into the realm of the “totality,” serves dignity and integrity goals
with the same logical consistency that continuing to exclude accuracy of
confessions serves those supplemental systemic goals. The proposition that
inaccuracy is relevant to voluntariness is just as true as the proposition that
accuracy is not relevant to voluntariness. Both propositions serve essential
dignity and integrity.
Not alone for pursuing truth do courts and law enforcement agencies
exist, after all. Theoretically or ideally, these human institutions exist and
work in assemblage to serve justice and liberty; to be a justice system, a name
they immodestly claim. They exist to demonstrate to the governed that no
governmental end is worth every possible means, let alone those means that
debase the humanity of both the governed and the government itself.
Precisely because they lay claim to the word justice, these institutions exist
to advance the paradoxical quest that winds through the whole history of
humankind: to advance norms of humanity and oust norms of inhumanity.
Humanity has been, and continues to be, puzzlingly hard for humans.
In that quest, though, truth is not subordinate; it merely must coexist
with other humane values also of first order.169 But if cases of inaccurate,
169
I am aware of nobody who ever has advocated sacrificing truth altogether to dignity
and integrity. Even before the Supreme Court applied harmless error doctrine to admission of
involuntary confessions in Arizona v. Fulminante, in the era of automatic reversal, it allowed
retrial on untainted evidence. And in the first instance, a trial court that rules a confession
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unreliable, or outright false confessions reveal nothing else, they unmask the
reality that inaccurate confessions do not advance reliably the search for
substantive truth. They are more likely to impede that search, sometimes
with disastrously mistaken verdicts that convict the innocent.
Stephen Boorn, Louise Butler, and Dogskin Johnson press this point
from the grave. Many more today and still to come depend upon police
officers, lawyers, and courts to grasp the point. In the end, a better
understanding of the rule in Rogers v. Richmond is symmetrical not just with
supplemental systemic goals, but with truth-seeking itself.

involuntary does not dismiss charges. It only excludes the involuntary confession and,
occasionally, its fruits. All other untainted evidence remains available for truth-seeking and
trial. See supra notes 101 and 102 and accompanying text.

